Billion-euro investments are gradually transforming the Slovak military and bringing it closer to NATO standards. However, modernization cannot solve all of the country’s weaknesses.
Miliardové investície postupne menia slovenskú armádu a približujú ju k štandardom NATO. Modernizácia však nedokáže vyriešiť všetky slabiny krajiny.
Slovakia has long underestimated investment in its armed forces
Slovakia long underestimated investment in its armed forces. A telling illustration is that before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it spent less than one percent of GDP on defence.
The watershed events of 2014 gradually forced a change in attitude. Slovakia could no longer ignore the state of its armed forces, but the real wake-up call came after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Billions in defence investments have not yet completely eliminated some of the country’s weaknesses. Money can address some of them – such as replacing old Soviet weapons with Western systems – but in several areas Slovakia has lost valuable time.
Because of accumulated orders from other allies, overstretched production capacities and the growing number of armed conflicts, Slovakia sometimes receives the equipment it needs with delays of several years. And by the time it arrives, modern warfare has moved on.
In an era when tanks and aircraft once dominated the battlefield, they are now being deployed very cautiously in Ukraine because they have become easy targets for much cheaper and highly effective drones.
The problems go further. Slovakia’s inability to clearly identify its main threat – Russia, against which it needs to defend itself – also undermines its progress in building deterrence.
Strained relations with its closest allies and an unreliable foreign policy further weaken Slovakia’s position and potential capabilities.
States prefer to choose suppliers and partners for joint projects who share their values and can be relied upon. Not those who might pass information to the enemy during one of their numerous trips to Moscow.
Last but not least, the current approach also affects public sentiment. At best, the public is disillusioned and opposes the government through initiatives supporting the country’s Western orientation. At worst, people become apathetic and confused. This is reflected in opinion polls, which show little willingness to defend the homeland.
We took a closer look at several aspects of the ongoing transformation of the Slovak armed forces as part of our overviews of the modernization of the V4 countries’ armed forces.
One thing that unites Heger and Fico: modernizing the army
Slovakia’s approach since the beginning of the war in Ukraine can be divided into two phases. The first lasted during the pro-European governments of Eduard Heger and Ľudovít Ódor (2021–2023), which were characterized by strong support for Ukraine and efforts to maintain NATO unity.
The second phase began after Robert Fico returned to power in 2023, bringing a significant shift in both domestic and foreign policy. Far less attention began to be paid to the Russian threat, while political relations with Moscow grew closer.
Although commercial arms deliveries to Ukraine continue, state military assistance has stopped, while relations with the West and Kyiv have gone from one confrontation to another.
Modernization projects, however, have progressed under all of the governments mentioned above. Defence spending first exceeded NATO’s two-percent target under Heger’s government, which launched a broad wave of public procurement and modernization projects. These gradually moved Slovakia away from outdated post-Soviet systems and toward equipment compatible with NATO standards.
Many of these modernization steps were linked to Slovakia’s military assistance to Ukraine, including the transfer of MiG-29 fighter jets and the S-300 air-defence system.
After donating them, Slovakia became significantly more dependent on its allies to protect its airspace.
NATO missions played a key role during the initial stages of the gap in Slovakia’s air defence, with allies – particularly the United States, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy – providing temporary equipment. Aircraft from the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary continue to help protect Slovak airspace.
In return, Slovakia secured more favourable conditions for procuring modern equipment, including F-16 fighter jets, Black Hawk helicopters, German Leopard tanks, Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicles and the MANTIS air-defence system, which was donated by Germany.
Fico’s government has continued the modernization projects already under way and has also launched new ones. The Long-Term Development Plan for the Slovak Defence Sector until 2040, published in May, envisages the modernization of small arms, tanks, howitzers, aircraft, helicopters and other equipment, while also setting personnel development as one of its goals.
By the end of 2032, Slovakia plans to have 19,300 soldiers, with the number expected to exceed 25,000 eight years later. The government has also launched a voluntary reserve programme under the National Defence Forces and established the Gendarmerie Corps.
Rhetorically it may not seem so, but Slovakia is deliberately replacing Russia with the West
Slovakia’s defence contracts are diversified but strongly oriented toward the West. Three main groups of suppliers dominate: the United States, Germany and European partners, alongside selected non-European suppliers such as Israel.
The United States is providing Slovakia’s most important modernization project: F-16 fighter jets. It has also supplied Black Hawk helicopters. During Marco Rubio’s visit to Bratislava, Robert Kaliňák also expressed interest in purchasing four additional F-16s from the United States, along with longer-range missiles and HIMARS systems.
Germany supplied 15 Leopard tanks in exchange for 30 BVP-1 infantry fighting vehicles sent to Ukraine. Sweden, meanwhile, is a key partner in the procurement of 152 CV90 MkIV tracked infantry fighting vehicles under a contract worth almost €1.3 billion, signed in 2022.
Israel is supplying the long-awaited Barak MX air-defence system, with all six batteries expected to be fully integrated into the Slovak armed forces by 2030. Barak will help Slovakia replace the Soviet S-300 and 2K12 Kub air-defence systems previously in use.
Slovakia was once heavily dependent on Russian military technology. That dependence has declined significantly over the years.
The country’s most important Soviet systems, including MiG-29 fighter jets and the S-300 system, were donated to Ukraine. Several older systems – such as the Soviet 9K38 Igla anti-aircraft missile system and T-72 tanks – remain in service with the Slovak armed forces, but the country is gradually replacing them with Western alternatives.
It has already introduced German Leopard 2A4 tanks into service and has also expressed interest in Polish Piorun air-defence systems.
The biggest obstacle to further growth is primarily the poor state of public finances. The long waiting times caused by overstretched Western defence industries are another constraint. Due to high demand and limited capacity, the industry cannot fulfil orders at the desired pace.
Growth of the domestic defence industry
Alongside modernizing its armed forces, Slovakia has also significantly strengthened its defence industry in recent years, although it remains more specialized than comprehensive. It includes companies such as KONŠTRUKTA-Defence, ZVS Holding, MSM Group, WAY Industries and Kerametal. Many of these companies belong to Czechoslovak Group, one of Europe’s fastest-growing defence companies.
The domestic market produces a mix of heavy military equipment, small arms and ammunition.
Slovakia has become a significant player particularly in the latter area. Companies such as VOP Nováky and ZVS Holding produce 155 mm artillery shells and other types of ammunition on a large and competitive industrial scale. As a result, Slovakia has become one of NATO’s leading producers of 155 mm artillery shells.
The country is accelerating these efforts even further. Under the SAFE defence loan programme, it signed a seven-year framework agreement with ZVS Holding, under which it aims to become a major ammunition supplier to the EU. The maximum value of the agreement is €58 billion.
The flagship product in heavy military equipment is the Zuzana 2 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, manufactured by KONŠTRUKTA-Defence.
Other significant products include the Wolf 4×4 multipurpose tactical vehicle, manufactured by Slovak company DefTech, and Božena demining systems produced by WAY Industries. Slovakia also manufactures small arms, including pistols, through companies such as Grand Power.
The damaging impact of an unreliable Slovak government
Although Slovakia’s defence capabilities have made progress in recent years, they continue to be hampered by several aspects of domestic politics.
The country’s security depends to a large extent on cooperation with its partners. This cooperation is largely based on good relations, predictable behaviour and the trust that follows from them. In Slovakia’s case, however, this issue has become increasingly pressing.
The increasingly ambiguous foreign policy under Robert Fico has undermined Slovakia’s credibility among its Western partners.
The state of the Slovak Information Service (SIS) is one example. Although it participates in intelligence cooperation within the EU and NATO, is a founding member of an international intelligence forum and joined the European Intelligence Academy in 2025, its reputation has long been poor.
After a three-month in-depth analysis, the French weekly L’Express, for example, assessed SIS as the worst intelligence service in Europe. Domestic analysts and opposition politicians have long warned that allies share less classified information with Slovakia than they did before Fico returned to power. And this issue extends beyond intelligence services.
A major turning point in Slovakia’s position came in spring 2024, when Fico disclosed confidential information from a discussion among allies in Paris. At the time, he publicly framed it as plans by the West to send troops to Ukraine, which he strongly and proactively opposed.
Since then, Slovakia has repeatedly found itself on the sidelines of discussions on major security issues. One example was the “drone wall” initiative on the EU’s eastern flank, to which Slovakia and Hungary were not initially invited. They subsequently had to push to be included, despite the initiative directly affecting them geographically.
Missing air defence, counter-drone capabilities and civilian preparedness
Although Slovakia is also systematically working to rebuild its air-defence capabilities, including through the acquisition of F-16 aircraft, gun systems for Black Hawk helicopters and Israeli Barak systems, it lacks sufficient technology for modern counter-drone warfare. In this area, it relies mainly on smaller systems such as MANTIS, Igla and some electronic jammers.
Tomáš Valášek, the shadow defence minister and former Slovak ambassador to NATO, told euBrief that filling this gap will require a combination of investments in combat helicopters, subsonic aircraft, drones designed to destroy other drones, and a network of acoustic and electronic sensors.
Very little is known about Slovakia’s efforts to strengthen its intelligence capabilities or cyber defence. Civil defence preparedness has often been criticized as seriously neglected, while pro-Russian narratives promoted by government representatives are increasingly unsettling the Slovak public.
This article was published as part of the project Searching for European Balance: The V4 Facing Global Pressures, a collaboration between the editorial teams of euBrief (Slovakia), Focus Europe Poland (Poland), Magyar Narancs (Hungary) and Update EU (Czech Republic). Project content is also available on Visegradinfo.eu. More information here.
