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As Ukraine defends itself on the battlefield, it also fights an intensifying information war. Across central Europe, Russian disinformation exploits fears, fuels anti-Ukraine sentiment, and undermines trust in democratic institutions. From fake news in Poland to EU scepticism in Slovakia, the Kremlin’s narratives adapt to each country’s vulnerabilities, including Ukraine’s own.

By Aleksandra Krzysztoszek (Euractiv.pl), Kateřina Zichová (Euractiv.cz), Natália Silenská (Euractiv.sk) and Yana Sliemzina (Gwara Media)

POLAND

Russia’s disinformation finds fertile ground in Poland’s polarised debate

As a neighbouring country, Poland faces numerous direct and indirect consequences of the war in Ukraine, including a rise in Russian disinformation.

Although some Russian propaganda outlets still operate in Poland and other platforms are suspected of spreading Kremlin-aligned narratives, their limited reach—combined with fact-checkers and independent media—has prevented major influence.

Limited foreign language skills among Poles also hinder the direct spread of Russian narratives from sources in Russia or Belarus. According to the Institute of Polish Language, only one in ten Poles speaks Russian, meaning just 5.7 million of the country’s 38 million citizens understand the language.

Still, anti-Ukrainian narratives in Polish are present and often amplified by far-right politicians.

While public support for aiding Ukraine remains high—limiting narratives blaming Kyiv—terms like "Banderites" and "Nazis" frequently appear online to describe Ukrainians and accuse them of crimes against Russian civilians.

There is also widespread hostile commentary targeting Russians, often using dehumanising language, such as calling them animals or wishing for their extinction. It is difficult to determine whether these posts originate from bots or genuine users, although some display clear Russian grammar or syntax errors suggesting troll farm origins.

Thousands of social media accounts that once focused on anti-vaccine rhetoric have since shifted to promoting anti-Ukrainian content.

In the first months after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Polish society showed strong resilience against disinformation, driven by solidarity with Ukraine. However, as the war continued, societal fatigue grew and vigilance declined, allowing anti-Ukrainian narratives to gain ground.

Poland, which received the highest number of Ukrainian war refugees in the early months of the invasion, became a focal point for narratives targeting Ukrainians living there.

Due to both economic migration and the refugee influx—peaking after February 2022—the Ukrainian population in Poland rose to 1.5 million, according to the Interior Ministry.

This demographic change triggered a wave of disinformation on Polish social media. Aimed at sowing division in Poland’s increasingly multicultural society, these narratives depict Ukrainians as ungrateful, with unrealistic expectations, and as undeserving recipients of aid—often said to receive more than Polish citizens.

Recurring claims suggest refugees enjoy privileged access to healthcare and services without contributing to the workforce. False narratives claim that Poles wait weeks for medical care, while Ukrainians receive free, instant treatment at private clinics.

One particularly egregious example is a widely circulated story alleging that Polish children were discharged from hospitals to make room for Ukrainian children with cancer. These anonymous claims imply Polish children were neglected and their parents forced to find treatment independently.

This story has been thoroughly debunked. The Polish Ministry of Health designated 120 medical facilities to treat Ukrainian patients, without displacing Polish ones.

Impact of narratives

It remains unclear how many people deliberately spread anti-Ukrainian content echoing Russian disinformation. Still, the information networks established by Moscow have allowed such narratives to quickly enter Polish discourse. Russia’s influence is too widespread to be easily neutralised.

Research confirms anti-refugee narratives have real impact. A study by the University of Warsaw found that 96% of Poles believe social benefits for Ukrainians should be reduced. Among those who recently changed their opinion of Ukrainians, 95% now hold a more negative view.

The effectiveness of anti-Ukrainian propaganda has been reinforced by stories portraying Ukrainians in Poland as a group not in need of support. These narratives depict them as wealthy individuals driving luxury cars and living in upscale Warsaw neighbourhoods like Wilanów—areas unaffordable for most Poles.

While some wealthier Ukrainians did relocate to Poland, most came seeking safety or a better life. The "rich Ukrainian" stereotype falsely implies all Ukrainians exploit Polish society and have gained dominance within it.

This fear has been weaponised by politicians, especially on the far right. The Confederation of the Polish Crown (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej), led by MEP Grzegorz Braun—who secured the fourth-highest vote in the 18 May presidential election—has submitted a draft law titled “Stop the Ukrainisation of Poland.”

According to the proposal, the law is “intended to urgently address the process of changing the ethnic structure of our country. (...) It is a well-thought-out tool for protecting the state and the Polish nation from their rapid disintegration.”

But anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is not limited to fringe parties. In the presidential campaign, right-wing candidates Karol Nawrocki and Sławomir Mentzen—who placed second and third—both opposed Ukraine’s potential EU membership.

Even Civic Platform’s candidate Rafał Trzaskowski, who is generally pro-Ukrainian, proposed limiting the monthly 800-zloty child benefit to Ukrainians who live and pay taxes in Poland.

Despite these developments, misleading narratives—especially about Ukraine—are being effectively countered by fact-checking organisations such as Demagog and Konkret24.

There are also government-led initiatives. “The government has recognised that disinformation is one of the most significant challenges that needs to be effectively countered. This concerns both external and internal sources—including the repetition of falsehoods that appear in the Polish public sphere,” Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Affairs Krzysztof Gawkowski told Euractiv Poland.

He highlighted a special unit within the Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK), which monitors and counters disinformation campaigns. According to Gawkowski, this department operates apolitically and focuses on critical cases.

The government also cooperates with internet service providers and online platforms to identify disinformation and issue public corrections. “Unfortunately, politicians themselves too often contribute to the spread of disinformation by presenting statements contrary to facts, which can end up supporting narratives aligned with those of Russia,” Gawkowski concluded.

CZECHIA

Czech experts warn of rising anti-Ukraine propaganda amid EU accession talks

This spring, interest in the topic of Ukraine surged among the Czech public and media. This was mirrored by a spike in activity on Czech disinformation websites, which published more content about Ukraine than mainstream media outlets. “The agency recorded more than 3,000 outputs on pravda-cz.com, over 2,000 on cz24.news, and nearly 2,000 on pravdive.eu,” Newton Media told Euractiv Czechia.

According to Jan Fridrichovský, a fact-checker from Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO), the most common disinformation narratives circulating in the Czech Republic aim to create the impression that financial and military support for Ukraine is pointless because Ukrainian officials are allegedly enriching themselves. “False posts on social media often highlight alleged corruption or misuse of Western financial aid to purchase luxury properties, jewellery, or cars. To a large extent, Russian propaganda is behind these disinformation efforts,” he explained.

Monitoring by the civil movement Czech Elves shows that since the beginning of the year, attacks on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have dominated Czech websites and social media. Prevailing narratives include portraying Russia as a defender and Ukraine as a puppet of the West, alongside repeated claims of Ukrainian corruption.

Claims of high levels of corruption in Ukraine appear to be the main reason why Czechs oppose starting EU accession talks with the country, according to an October 2023 CEDMO survey. In that poll, 41% of respondents opposed launching negotiations, while 30% were in favour and the rest had no clear opinion.

“The fact that around a third of the population believes this claim about corruption levels in Ukraine indicates the relative success of disinformation campaigns. We also tested the impact of a false claim suggesting the EU is investing in the Ukrainian pharmaceutical industry to import medicines from there. More than a quarter of Czech citizens (28%) believe this statement,” added CEDMO analyst Ivan R. Cuker.

Kristína Šefčíková, an analyst at the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI), noted that other narratives surrounding Ukraine’s potential EU membership are also spreading in the Czech environment. These typically include misleading claims about migration designed to stir fear. “These include suggestions that Ukrainians would threaten job availability in the EU or that European agricultural subsidies would be redirected to Ukrainian producers. Other narratives rely on harmful stereotypes, such as a flood of low-quality Ukrainian goods, criminals, or even the spread of infectious diseases threatening public health,” she told Euractiv Czechia.

Fridrichovský explained that disinformation in the Czech Republic spreads mainly through three channels: conspiracy or disinformation websites that either create or republish such content from abroad; social media actors with large followings or the ability to go viral through group sharing; and Russian propaganda channels.

However, not all false content qualifies as disinformation — i.e. deliberately spread falsehoods. “Much of the false content on social media verified by CEDMO’s fact-checking organisations was not created intentionally. It often stems from misinterpretations of data, or images and videos taken out of context. Their creators and spreaders are usually ordinary social media users,” the analyst noted.

In a flood of information where it’s often hard to distinguish reliable sources, free media play a vital role, Šefčíková stressed. “Countries known for their high information resilience, such as Finland or the Baltic states, also show high levels of trust in the media,” she added.

Šefčíková emphasised the importance of dedicated media programming to counter disinformation. “Czech Radio already fulfils this role systematically through its ‘Ověřovna’ segment. We recommend launching a similar regular programme on Czech Television,” she wrote in an analysis published by PSSI.

She believes Czech journalists are now well qualified to deal with disinformation. The challenge, however, lies in the pursuit of sensationalism. “The bigger problem is balancing objective reporting and journalistic standards with the so-called attention economy, which can encourage sensationalist content,” she warned.

Building resilience also requires technical measures. In April last year, the Czech News Agency (ČTK) was hit by a cyberattack, during which hackers spread pro-Russian disinformation on its website.

The state also plays a role in the fight against disinformation. “It’s certainly a good thing that the state has decided to actively engage in combating disinformation, replacing a previously passive approach with concrete action,” said PSSI analyst Ondřej Perušič.

Initially, the Czech Republic had a government commissioner for media and disinformation, a position held by media expert Michal Klíma. He was dismissed in February 2023, and the disinformation agenda was taken over by the prime minister’s national security advisor, Tomáš Pojar, who is reportedly more reserved about confronting disinformation.

Still, Perušič considers it a positive sign that the Czech government continues to address the issue. “Steps in the right direction include the establishment of strategic communication departments within ministries, a specialised office at the Government Office, and the Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats at the Ministry of the Interior,” he said.

However, domestic strategy and coordination still need improvement. “Future priorities should include better coordination between institutions, stratcom units and centres, and the creation of a national strategic communication concept — areas where current shortcomings remain,” he added.

The open question, the expert concluded, is whether this “key security policy” will be maintained after the upcoming parliamentary elections and any resulting change in government.

SLOVAKIA

Slovak government echoes Kremlin narratives

Slovak disinformation and pro-Kremlin actors attempt to portray war-torn Ukraine either as a “puppet of the West,” emphasise its past corruption issues — while ignoring country’s significant reform progress — or try to justify Russia’s war by citing so-called concerns over NATO expansion or the rights of Russian-speaking populations being ignored.

Sadly, the way Ukraine is depicted in disinformation campaigns often mirrors how it is portrayed by Slovakia’s current government of PM Robert Fico.

Disinformation narratives about the EU and Ukraine take various forms as well. Fico, for instance, has repeatedly labelled the EU a “war cabinet” which undermines the peace process and “supports the killing of Slavs in Ukraine,” among many other debunked pro-Kremlin narratives.

Despite this rhetoric, there are aspects connected to Ukraine that Fico’s government does not approach with hostility. These include, for example, Ukrainian refugees or Kyiv’s bid to join the EU.

Fico’s government supports Ukraine’s EU accession to such an extent that it has even raised eyebrows from its pro-Russian ally, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who opposes it.

Tomáš Strážay, director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), attributes this Slovak government position to simple “pragmatism”, as the EU integration of Ukraine would inevitably lead to economic growth in the bordering regions of eastern Slovakia.

Nevertheless, on Thursday, one of the rare concerns related to Ukraine’s EU accession was voiced by the Slovak Agricultural and Food Chamber (SPPK).

At a press conference, farmers pointed out that Ukraine is a global agricultural powerhouse, and “neither Slovakia nor the EU as a whole is ready” to face such intense competition.

SPPK Vice President Emil Macho also argued that Ukrainian farmers are not subject to the same environmental and production regulations as Slovak ones and have so far adopted only “40 percent of EU legislation”. According to him, Ukraine’s entry into the EU would be “the final nail in the coffin for Slovakia’s agrisector.”

However, this advantage would likely be lost once Ukraine becomes part of the EU. As part of the common market and agricultural policy, Ukrainian farmers would be required to comply under the same rules.

The role of the free press and internet

Slovak journalists face a unique challenge in debunking anti-Ukrainian disinformation, given that some of it is openly endorsed by government officials.

Government also frequently attacks mainstream media and prefer to spread its messaging via social networks or so-called disinformation outlets that do not follow journalistic standards.

As a result of ongoing attacks and political polarisation, Slovakia’s mainstream media also suffer from low public trust — only 20% of Slovaks turn to them for information on world affairs, compared to 57% in the Czech Republic.

Despite these difficulties, Jakub Goda, a disinformation expert who previously worked for pro-European ex-President Zuzana Čaputová and the Ministry of Health, believes there are Slovak journalists “doing an excellent job”, though the picture varies across newsrooms.

“One common problem I see is when media or news agencies reproduce statements by Russian officials without context or fact-checking. Or when headlines are crafted in a way that spreads Russian propaganda, with the actual clarification buried in the article,” he told Euractiv Slovakia.

On the other hand, he is more critical of how harmful Slovak-language content is moderated on digital platforms. 

“The quality of moderation by Meta or Google in Slovakia has long been insufficient, and in the case of X [formerly Twitter], it’s catastrophic,” he said.

Available information indicates that social media platforms have only a very limited number of human content moderators for some EU languages. Back in 2023, as reported by Globalwitness, neither X nor Snapchat had a single moderator speaking Slovak language. 

Among recent changes implemented by Meta, he perceives one as potentially significant: users are now being shown more political content, even from the pages they don’t even follow. “Other changes are less immediately visible,” Goda added.

The image of Slovakia as a country saturated with disinformation is only reinforced by the fact that state institutions have essentially abandoned efforts to counter it.

Under previous pro-EU and pro-Ukrainian governments, ministries and public authorities openly flagged and debunked pro-Kremlin disinformation. But these communication efforts came to a halt with the arrival of Fico’s government in 2023.  

UKRAINE

Pro-Kremlin narratives gain traction online despite Ukraine’s resilience

A few weeks before the first round of the Polish presidential election on 18 May, pro-Russian Telegram channels began circulating a fake video, supposedly from Polish broadcaster TVP World. The video falsely claimed that 68% of Poles believed Vladimir Putin would make “a perfect president for their country.”

Fact-checkers at Gwara Media debunked the video, linking it to a broader narrative that Russia uses to target Ukrainian online spaces—namely, that Putin and Russia enjoy widespread international support.

This narrative aims to stir feelings of abandonment and disgust towards Europe among Ukrainians, while also serving domestic propaganda purposes by suggesting to Russians that their leader is respected abroad.

“The ratings of the Russian leader are higher than those of any other candidates,” claimed the Telegram channel "Kostian Cat," one of many flagged by Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation (CCD) for spreading hostile propaganda. The CCD publishes such lists to warn Ukrainians about untrustworthy sources.

Ukraine has developed a strong record in countering disinformation. The 2024 Disinformation Resilience Index (DRI) ranked Ukraine highest among ten Central and Eastern European countries, calling the country’s progress “a remarkable achievement” after over two years of full-scale Russian aggression. Ukraine also held the top score in DRI’s 2021 study.

A 2023 poll by the Kyiv Institute for Sociology found that 71% of Ukrainians consider Russian disinformation a threat. While views differ on the severity of this threat, general awareness and familiarity with disinformation tactics help many citizens avoid falling for basic fakes. Rather than reduce its efforts, Russia has intensified its campaigns.

According to research published by Gwara Media, disinformation narratives discrediting European and American leaders accounted for 13.7% of fakes processed in early 2024. Other messages suggested that “the West doesn’t need Ukraine” (5.9%) or pushed homophobic tropes about the arrival of “gay values” from Europe (2.0%).

EU is painted as a community of moral decline

Smear campaigns have targeted pro-Ukrainian politicians. For instance, recycled attacks on Moldova’s Maia Sandu resurfaced following the Romanian local election victory of Nicușor Dan. Other fakes targeted French President Emmanuel Macron, accusing him of carrying a “bag of white powder”—a reference to his 2023 remarks on possibly sending troops to support Ukraine.

Olga Yakovleva, editor and analyst from Gwara Media’s fact-checking department, explains: “EU is painted as a community of moral decline and social destabilization, cultural degradation, (community) that’s antagonistic to traditional values.” 

Such messages are manufactured, Yakovleva says, to paint eurointegration as a “wrong choice” for Ukraine. 

Homophobic and transphobic fakes about Europe (where children are supposedly forced to wear LGBTQ+ flags), manufactured in pro-Russian Telegram channels, neatly echo larger anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric pushed by the far-right and conservative actors across the globe—even more so since Donald Trump took office in the USA for the second time. 

Then, pro-Russian channels consistently craft narratives about Ukrainian refugees in Europe who are supposedly lazy and ungrateful and create fake covers from European magazines that paint Ukraine or Volodymyr Zelenskyy as corrupt, greedy, or cowardly.  

That method also works both ways: to convince Russians everyone abroad hates Ukraine—and to convince people in Ukraine that the European public hates Ukraine. 

Disinformation is mostly disseminated via anonymous Telegram groups, but Twitter (X) has become a prominent place for it since Elon Mask bought it—especially with disinformation connected to Ukraine and the EU. 

The fake with Macron and the white powder he supposedly pockets after the talk with Starmer and Merz was spread both by the spokesperson for Russian Foreign Affair’s Ministry Mariya Zaharova (in Russian) — and by Alex Jones, far-right radio host and a fan of conspiracy theories (in English.) 

After Musk’s arrival, the destruction of the Blue Check system that validated ID behind the user’s handle on X—and new leadership firing multiple content moderators—allowed many to masquerade as experts and journalists for just $8. 

“Elon Musk himself sometimes spreads information that doesn't correspond with reality and reposts from anonymous accounts (e.g., he reposted a fake about Hollywood stars being paid by USAID to come to Ukraine — ed.), so what can be said about the efficiency of moderation on X?” Yakovleva asks. 

Other platforms also face moderation challenges. According to Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s CCD, TikTok is currently the most efficient in limiting disinformation and especially cooperative in restricting access to Russian-made deepfakes. Still, Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information (IMI) warns that TikTok should not be seen as a reliable news source.

Google presents a different problem: it often blocks videos that document Russian war crimes or destruction in Ukraine. Kovalenko said this results from Google's “policy of peace,” which some propagandists exploit by spreading disinformation from abroad via Google’s platforms.

Meta also struggles with content moderation. Instagram hosts disinformation-based memes, while Facebook bots rapidly boost the reach of fake news pages and so-called patriotic communities. Yakovleva attributed these issues partly to mass layoffs of moderators, especially in less prioritised regions such as Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.

Despite Ukraine’s efforts to tackle Russian disinformation at the state level, both government officials and independent experts say it is insufficient. 

While the DRI praised Ukraine’s resilience, it also found the national disinformation response system fragmented, social media largely unregulated, and media literacy among the public still in need of improvement.

The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
The project is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.