On 31 March 2026, Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe (PEJ) submitted a formal application to the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency for a construction permit to build Poland’s first nuclear power plant at the Lubiatowo-Kopalino site.
After fifteen years of modern planning and several decades of sporadic national debate, the project has finally transcended its status as a mere political totem to face the cold reality of executive verification.
The application itself is a gargantuan undertaking, comprising over 40,000 pages authored by more than 200 experts in nuclear safety, radiological protection, engineering, and geology.
At its heart lies the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, a document intended to prove the project’s adherence to the most stringent international benchmarks and mark a definitive turning point in Polish energy history.
As the PEJ press office notes, the initiation of this licensing procedure subjects the project to a rigorous assessment by national nuclear regulators—a prerequisite that must be satisfied before any fundamental construction work can commence.
According to the current roadmap, major construction is slated to begin in 2028, following a separate permit from the Pomeranian Voivode expected in 2027.
Strategic Partnership with the United States
The technological alliance underpinning the project carries heavy geopolitical weight. Poland has opted for three Westinghouse AP1000 reactors with a combined capacity of 3,750 MW to be situated in Pomerania, with Bechtel overseeing the engineering and construction.
Wojciech Kukuła, a board member of the ClientEarth Lawyers for the Earth Foundation, observes that the decision regarding the reactor technology is settled, noting that Poland is purchasing a specific, market-ready technology from a supplier that currently offers no newer alternatives.
This choice extends far beyond engineering; the nuclear programme serves to cement a strategic bond with the United States, a relationship already signalled by an initial credit agreement with the Export-Import Bank of the United States to fund preparatory and engineering works.
However, while Poland will own the physical facility, it will not own the underlying technology—a limitation that will likely influence the project’s trajectory for decades.
Financing and State Support
Financially, the project is supported by a staggering 178 billion PLN (approximately €42 billion) state aid package approved by the European Commission in December 2025.
This unprecedented support system rests on three pillars: the recapitalisation of PEJ by the State Treasury, full state bank guarantees, and a forty-year "contract for difference" (CfD).
Under this CfD mechanism, a strike price is set—500 PLN per megawatt-hour, indexed to inflation. If the market price falls below this level, the state subsidises the difference; if it rises above, the operator returns the surplus to the national budget.
This model mirrors the British Hinkley Point C project, where consumers effectively co-finance the investment through a monthly levy on their energy bills.
For investors, the primary value of the CfD is predictability, allowing for long-term calculations and credit applications based on a guaranteed revenue stream.
Market reception has been remarkably robust; a recent market sounding process yielded 26 financial offers that significantly exceeded the project's requirements, alongside declarations from 11 export credit agencies totaling roughly 100 billion PLN.
Nuclear Energy and Poland’s Energy Transition
The nuclear programme is essential to Poland's broader energy transition as its coal fleet faces an accelerated decline and subsidies for fossil fuels gradually expire.
The government aims to bring 6–9 GW of nuclear capacity online starting in the mid-2030s, potentially meeting one-third of the nation’s current electricity demand.
PEJ maintains that the plant will provide a stable, dispatchable, and zero-emission source of power for over 60 years, acting as a crucial stabiliser for a grid increasingly reliant on variable renewable energy sources.
Unlike coal, nuclear power involves immense upfront costs but offers low operational expenses, free from significant fuel costs or carbon emission fees.
Debate Over a Second Nuclear Plant
Meanwhile, a political tug-of-war is emerging over the location of a second nuclear plant.
Following discussions with President Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister Donald Tusk identified France as a serious potential partner for this second venture, suggesting that Bełchatów is the leading candidate for the site due to social and industrial factors.
Wojciech Wrochna, the government’s plenipotentiary for strategic energy infrastructure, confirmed that Bełchatów and Konin remain priority locations, with Połaniec and Kozienice as backups.
While replacing coal with atoms in traditional industrial heartlands is politically attractive, analysts warn that mining regions fear a nuclear acceleration could hasten the closure of mines without a sufficiently robust transition plan for the workforce.
A final decision on the technology provider for this second site—contested by Canadian, American, and French firms—is expected by 2027.
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
In the periphery of these large-scale ambitions lies the debate over Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
Although Orlen previously voiced ambitions to deploy the world’s first SMR by 2030, Kukuła remains sceptical, pointing out that the technology is not yet commercially available for purchase.
Nevertheless, SMRs offer a distinct advantage: they can simultaneously produce heat and electricity, whereas large-scale reactors typically waste the thermal energy generated during production.
Despite the lack of a firm timeline, there are conceptual plans to station an SMR at the Żerań plant in Warsaw to feed the city's heating network.
This move aligns with EU taxonomy, which has grown increasingly supportive of nuclear investments, particularly SMRs.
From Political Vision to Industrial Reality
Ultimately, March 2026 represents the closing of a long historical chapter. The project has evolved from a decades-old dream, spanning back to the communist era, into a tangible industrial reality.
The massive recapitalisation and hiring surge at PEJ four years ago signaled that the project had moved beyond political rhetoric.
The defining challenge of the next 24 months will be maintaining the schedule and containing costs during the licensing and supply chain contracting phases.
These upcoming hurdles will determine whether Poland’s nuclear programme becomes the backbone of its physical infrastructure or remains an expensive symbol of political aspiration.
