Although none of the V4 countries has deposits of rare earth elements, all of them are striving to secure their place in the future of the EU’s critical raw materials sector.
by Lucia Lauková , Máté Csabai , Adam Radoliński , Karolina Lettrichová
If there were a map of Europe showing who controls the raw materials of the future, Central Europe would likely appear as a blank spot. Although the Visegrád countries possess several critical raw materials beneath their soil, including lithium and antimony, they lack rare earth elements—the materials that power electric vehicles, the defence industry and wind turbines. Without them, the V4 countries have a weaker voice in Europe's debate on raw materials and technological independence.
Four Countries, Four Strategies
The common conclusion from the experiences of all four Visegrád countries is both simple and uncomfortable. Each has chosen a different strategy, yet none guarantees real influence on its own. Hungary has attracted battery factories but failed to develop domestic suppliers. Czechia has lithium but remains stuck in lengthy permitting procedures. Slovakia's position is closer to Poland's: while its northern neighbour focuses on extracting value from mining waste left by its coal industry, Slovakia also sees potential in similar resources but is only beginning to map what could be economically exploited.
All four countries also share another concern—that European mechanisms designed to help them, including the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), RESourceEU and joint procurement schemes, are structured in a way that inherently favours Western Europe.
According to Dr Łukasz Kruszewski of the Institute of Geological Sciences at the Polish Academy of Sciences, conventional rare earth deposits in igneous rocks, carbonatites and alkaline complexes remain nothing more than small mineralogical curiosities throughout the region, with no realistic industrial potential.
The political significance of this absence became evident in April 2025, when China imposed export controls on seven heavy rare earth elements and permanent magnets, disrupting supplies to European car manufacturers and wind turbine producers.
Meanwhile, the United States launched its own raw materials diplomacy, while Central Europe remained largely an observer rather than a participant. The four national responses illustrate that geological disadvantages can be addressed in different ways—but none offers certainty.
Hungary: Factories Without an Ecosystem
Hungary adopted the most radical—and most expensive—approach. Within just a few years, it transformed itself into one of Europe's largest battery manufacturing hubs by offering generous incentives to South Korean companies Samsung, LG and SK On, as well as China's CATL. Public support for the three largest plants alone amounted to roughly €350 million.
The strategy, however, suffers from a structural weakness. Chinese and Korean manufacturers have brought their own suppliers and management teams instead of integrating into the domestic economy. Hungarian firms remain confined to low-value-added activities. One industry expert admitted he was shocked to discover that even factory canteens are operated by Chinese subcontractors.
The social costs have also become increasingly visible. Residents of Göd complain about water pollution and noise, investigative journalists have exposed attempts to conceal health risks for workers, and environmental protests against CATL's factory in Debrecen have continued since 2023.
The previous government responded to the lack of domestic raw materials by launching a National Exploration Programme running until 2030, with particular attention given to the Recsk deposit. Bence Gonda, Vice-President of the Hungarian Regulatory Authority, describes it as a strategic asset thanks to its reserves of copper, zinc, lead, silver, molybdenum and rhenium. Its future, however, became uncertain after Péter Magyar won the April 2026 elections, as government sources claimed the programme had primarily benefited people close to Viktor Orbán before the change of power.
The lesson is clear: attracting factories alone is not a measure of success. European joint procurement mechanisms will create lasting value for Hungary only if domestic companies become part of the strategic segments of the value chain. Otherwise, they will merely strengthen the position of foreign corporations operating in Hungary.
Czechia: Lithium at Cínovec and the Missing Value Chain
Czechia enters the race from a strong industrial position. The automotive sector employs nearly half a million people and accounts for around 10 percent of GDP, similar to Slovakia. In terms of manufacturing gross value added, Czechia has the highest share in the EU. Nevertheless, imports of batteries from China have already reached a record €2.5 billion.
Filip Křenek of the EUROPEUM Institute argues that completely decoupling from Chinese supply chains is unrealistic. China dominates not only mining but, more importantly, raw material processing. Diversifying lithium supplies is relatively achievable through countries such as Australia, Chile and Canada, but building alternative processing capacity for rare earths and permanent magnets will take much longer.
The country's key asset is the lithium deposit at Cínovec, operated by Geomet, part of the ČEZ Group. The CZK 42 billion investment is the largest in the history of the Ústí Region, and the site is estimated to contain around three percent of global lithium reserves.
Jaroslav Verner of ČEZ argues that domestic lithium production will help preserve jobs and the country's automotive tradition. The European Commission has recognised Cínovec as a strategic project under the CRMA, and annual production of 37,000 tonnes of lithium hydroxide could supply batteries for more than one million electric vehicles. Mining, however, is unlikely to begin before around 2030 due to environmental permitting delays.
Křenek warns that if Czechia remains merely a supplier of raw materials while higher-value production moves to Germany, Hungary or Poland, its strategic gains will remain limited. Jan Vejbor of the Czech Battery Cluster adds that the absence of large-scale battery production is also slowing the development of recycling because there is simply not enough material available for processing.
Slovakia: Mapping Its Resources
Slovakia enters the discussion with a major structural disadvantage. In 2024, it imported 44.5 percent of its material inputs—almost twice the European average of 22.4 percent. Waste heaps and tailings ponds left by historical mining have become more of a regulatory burden than an opportunity, despite the country's potential antimony deposits in the Little Carpathians and lithium resources near Henclová.
Last June, the government approved the National Programme for the Geological Exploration of Critical Mineral Resources, the first document of its kind in decades. Besides mapping deposits, it also examines old mining waste as a potential secondary source of critical raw materials.
The key question concerns Slovakia's place within the battery value chain. Patrik Križanský of the Slovak Electric Vehicle Association (SEVA) explains why gigafactories are less important than they appear. Gigafactories do not purchase lithium directly—they buy cathode active materials (CAM), and Slovakia currently has no CAM producer. These companies are the ones that benefit from joint procurement mechanisms, and the planned Chinese Gotion gigafactory in Šurany will not solve this missing link.
Another major problem is Slovakia's exclusion from the first wave of 47 strategic CRMA projects. According to Križanský, unless Slovakia secures inclusion in future rounds, domestic companies risk becoming second-tier suppliers, widening the gap between Western Europe and the V4 countries.
Poland: New Raw Materials Hidden in Old Waste
Among the V4 countries, Poland has the weakest geological position regarding primary rare earth deposits. It does, however, possess a resource that until recently attracted little attention: millions of tonnes of mining waste heaps and coal deposits.
Kruszewski argues that coal itself contains the greatest potential for rare earth elements and points out that China and Russia have been exploiting this opportunity for years.
The focus is particularly on carbon-rich shales that accompany coal seams and are discarded as waste during mining. Kruszewski criticises the simplistic debate portraying coal solely as either fuel or an environmental problem. Coal can also serve as a raw material for extracting neodymium, dysprosium and other elements essential for permanent magnets used in wind turbines.
Promising sites include germanium and gallium associated with coal in the Lublin region and Upper Silesia, cobalt and rare earth-enriched black shales near Legnica, yttrium and heavy lanthanides near the former uranium mines at Kowary, and a potentially promising but unconfirmed deposit in the Tajno massif near Suwałki.
The economic argument is straightforward: low concentrations do not necessarily mean small volumes. Individual waste heaps contain tens of millions of tonnes of material. Kruszewski points to Virginia in the United States, where Paul Ziemkiewicz's research team developed an economically viable method for recovering rare earth elements and cobalt from mining waste. He also highlights heap leaching and, in the future, biological extraction using microorganisms currently being studied at the University of Warsaw.
The Polish government has outlined its ambitions in the National Programme for the Exploration of Critical Mineral Resources, with a budget of PLN 180 million running until 2032. Compared with Spain's investment of more than €180 million, however, the funding remains relatively modest. According to current plans, the greatest transformational potential lies in the rare earth processing plant to be built in Puławy by Grupo MKANGO and Grupa Azoty between 2027 and 2028.
A Common Strategy Is Still Missing
The common framework for all four countries is the EU legislative package adopted between 2023 and 2025. Yet in April 2026, the European Court of Auditors issued a critical assessment, concluding that the CRMA's targets are non-binding and insufficiently justified, while many strategic projects are unlikely to secure supplies by 2030 because permitting procedures still take an average of 15 years.
Experts from all four countries agree that regional cooperation is not a choice but a necessity. Yet this conclusion reflects a broader weakness of European raw materials policy: the analytical diagnosis is convincing, but institutional implementation remains lacking.
Poland has mining waste rather than deposits. Czechia has a strategic project waiting for permits. Slovakia is still mapping its resources while trying to secure a place in future CRMA projects. Hungary has factories disconnected from its domestic economy and faces political uncertainty.
The race for strategic raw materials is moving quickly, and the stakes are high. Whether the Visegrád countries can take a seat at the table as players—rather than merely serving as the playing field—remains an open question.
