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Poland is paying more for its security today than ever before in its post-war history. Thanks to multibillion-dollar contracts, it is building the strongest army since the Cold War, already surpassing Germany and France in terms of both troop numbers and equipment. But this strength comes at a price that Warsaw will be paying for decades.

Poland's defence system is now based simultaneously on deep integration into NATO structures, the US military presence, large-scale rearmament through foreign purchases and licensed production, as well as a still significant layer of Soviet-era equipment which, although being systematically phased out, has not yet completely disappeared from the arsenal.

The Armed Forces Development Programme for 2025–2039 and technical modernisation plans focus on expanding mechanised divisions, territorial defence forces, air defence and long-range artillery and missile units, with particular emphasis on strengthening the Suwałki Gap – the strategically sensitive border area between Poland and Lithuania, considered one of the most vulnerable points on the Alliance's entire eastern flank.

The scale of these ambitions is reflected in the figures. As Mariusz Marszałkowski, a security analyst and deputy editor-in-chief of Defence24.pl, notes, at the beginning of the decade Poland's defence budget stood at around PLN 40–50 billion, while today it is approaching PLN 200 billion – almost 5 percent of GDP, making Poland one of NATO's largest defence spenders relative to GDP.

This scale, however, raises questions about the state's administrative capacity to manage it. The question of how the Ministry of National Defence intends to distribute such enormous resources without losing control over the pace and quality of contract implementation is far from marginal. It concerns the very core of the strategy: contract costs are concentrated over several years, while the benefits in the form of fully operational military capabilities are spread over a much longer period.

The Warsaw Pact Legacy

Part of the price Poland is paying for security today is inherited from the past. For decades, the country had to maintain a mixed arsenal inherited from the Warsaw Pact era, and today's rearmament is intended to be the final step in overcoming this structural complexity. Although Soviet- and Russian-made equipment is still present, primarily in the form of older aircraft, helicopters and selected support systems, its role is steadily declining.

Marszałkowski calls this effect "island modernisation."

"Today, the Polish Armed Forces possess ultra-modern systems such as F-35 fighter jets and Patriot systems, while at the same time struggling with deep underinvestment in other areas, a striking example being the outdated submarine fleet and the overall condition of the navy," the expert explains.

The situation has been further complicated by the transfer of a significant share of Poland's post-Soviet equipment to Ukraine as part of military assistance. This has forced Poland not only to modernise its existing structures but also to urgently rebuild capabilities depleted by those transfers. According to the Defence24.pl analyst, the country is "halfway through this process."

"Implementing complex orders for modern equipment takes time," he stresses.

Two New Creditors

The cost of Poland's strategic security also has a broad geopolitical dimension, reflected in its growing dependence on two countries: the United States and South Korea.

The most visible American presence is in air defence, aviation, command systems and helicopters. Key contracts include Boeing's AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, Northrop Grumman's integrated battle command system, as well as American radars and missile defence systems, including Patriot and HIMARS launchers.

South Korea has become the second pillar. K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, FA-50 light combat aircraft and K239 Chunmoo rocket launchers are accompanied by extensive plans for further cooperation, including local assembly, servicing and deeper industrial integration.

Lieutenant General Jarosław Gromadziński, president of the Defence Institute, explains this direction in pragmatic terms.

"Parallel donations to Ukraine – more than 350 tanks, over 100 self-propelled howitzers and numerous infantry fighting vehicles – temporarily depleted our own capabilities. This forced the authorities to immediately replenish shortages wherever equipment was readily available," General Gromadziński explains.

In his view, the European defence industry was too weak to respond to the situation.

"Britain abandoned mass production and scrapped older tank models, France is struggling with problems surrounding the Leclerc platform, while German production capacity of around 20–30 Leopard tanks per year does not meet the real needs of modern armies," he says.

European suppliers – Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries – remain important, although their role is narrower and focused primarily on submarines, aircraft, helicopters and naval systems.

Between PGZ and the Private Sector

Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa remains the central pillar of Poland's defence industry, bringing together dozens of state-owned companies and serving as the main interface for industrial cooperation and technology transfer.

Polish industry currently produces artillery systems, both towed and self-propelled, missile components, small arms, ammunition, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, as well as radars and sensors integrated into broader allied systems.

Polish shipyards, meanwhile, build patrol vessels, mine-countermeasure ships and components for allied programmes. Companies such as PIT-RADWAR and the Gdańsk-based APS are, according to Gromadziński, leaders in advanced radar systems and counter-drone solutions. Poland is also set to launch full-scale production of South Korean K2 tanks, enabling the transfer of modern technologies.

This picture of industrial expansion has structural limitations.

Marszałkowski points out that Polish defence companies spent years operating on a "drip-feed of orders."

"Authorities contracted only the absolute minimum necessary to maintain jobs and avoid social unrest instead of financing research and development. When enormous demand emerged, it turned out that domestic industry lacked sufficient workers, modern machinery and ready-made products. Rebuilding this capacity, constructing new facilities and implementing technologies will take many years," Marszałkowski explains.

Poland successfully produces Krab howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, small arms and radar systems, but still lacks the capabilities to develop advanced air defence systems, fighter aircraft and missile systems, forcing the country to rely on imports.

Gromadziński also points to the political instability of PGZ itself. As a state-owned company, it is subject to political influence and changes following elections. The fact that the company has had twelve CEOs in thirteen years makes it impossible, in his view, to develop and implement an effective long-term strategy.

The private sector operates under very different conditions. WB Group, active in communications, drones, loitering munitions and electronics, has already gained international recognition.

Air Defence, Artillery and Range

According to Gromadziński, the modernisation priority is to build a layered air defence system integrating ballistic, missile, conventional air and counter-drone defence.

Poland has already acquired two Patriot batteries equipped with the IBCS command system, which, as the Defence Institute president points out, "apart from Poland, is operated only by the Americans."

The Narew programme, based on two batteries purchased from the British, still requires further development.

Equally dramatic changes are taking place in the ground forces and artillery.

"The Polish Army has completely abandoned the post-Soviet 152 mm and 122 mm calibres in favour of the NATO-standard 155 mm, which is being introduced in very large numbers. This capability is reinforced by purchases of 290 Korean K239 Chunmoo launchers and American HIMARS systems, providing the ability to strike targets at distances of up to 300 kilometres," Gromadziński notes.

Poland is also developing long-range strike capabilities exceeding 1,000 kilometres.

Marszałkowski points to the realities of the battlefield: although investments in artillery, drones and long-range systems deserve praise, "the scale of orders compared with the realities of the war in Ukraine, where hundreds of unmanned systems disappear every day, still appears modest."

"Army modernisation is a process lasting decades," he notes.

In his view, procurement strategy must balance immediate needs with the state's financial capacity and prioritise flexibility over stockpiling equipment that quickly becomes obsolete, so that production can be rapidly scaled up in the event of a crisis.

The ageing of military equipment is illustrated by Poland's F-16s, which have been in service for more than twenty years and now require costly upgrades.

Political Dependence

Poland's security is now deeply tied to the continuity of US support and broader NATO backing on the eastern flank. This makes the country safer, but also more vulnerable to changes in allied policy, industrial capabilities and transatlantic priorities – areas over which Warsaw has limited influence.

The scale and durability of the American military presence in Poland remains a matter of genuine debate. Proposals concerning the future of the US strategic presence in Europe have caused concern both in Warsaw and Brussels.

Marszałkowski sees this as a structural change in Europe's security architecture.

"Changes in US policy and a reduction in its permanent military presence in Europe mean that European members will bear the main responsibility for collective defence," he says, adding: "Although the Americans will provide support, we must have our own strong capabilities."

In his view, complete autarky is impossible today. Even powers such as the US and Russia rely on international cooperation, while importing certain components – such as German engines for armoured vehicles – can be a rational business and technological solution.

The Polish-Polish War as a Hidden Cost

According to Gromadziński, the most sensitive element of Poland's emerging defence autonomy is the political instability of the decision-making process.

He identifies the "destructive Polish-Polish war" as the greatest obstacle, directly undermining the country's security.

"Politicians should sit down at a round table and develop a lasting 'Constitution for Security' that guarantees continuity in implementing strategic objectives regardless of changes in government," the general argues.

He considers it unacceptable that key projects should depend on the political affiliation of a ministry, while Poland has not updated its National Security Strategy for six years and continues to rely on a document from 2020.

"The army and civil defence should be completely removed from political spoils because soldiers and officers serve the entire society, not individual parties," he stresses.

He also criticises the current command structure of the armed forces, which is based on three headquarters and, in his view, operates inefficiently and creates too many levels of decision-making.

Poland needs a profound reform that would centralise command, simplify procedures and ensure the rapid, digital flow of operational information in real time.

The experience of the war in Ukraine clearly demonstrates the need to reduce bureaucracy and decentralise operational responsibilities so that key tactical decisions can be made by local commanders rather than exclusively in Warsaw.

Marszałkowski, meanwhile, offers an operational recommendation: to strengthen Poland's strategic resilience, the defence minister should first reform the military mobilisation system. Efficient reserve training, precise mobilisation procedures and preparing units to receive mobilised citizens require urgent systemic changes.

The Bill Is Not Settled Yet

Poland's rearmament is not yet complete, and its full effects will only become visible in several years.

Marszałkowski estimates that it will take roughly another five years of intensive development before the country reaches a level of modernisation that guarantees the full ability to defend its territory effectively. In his view, Poland "is not yet ready to independently repel a potential Russian attack."

The cost of Poland's strategic security is therefore not limited to the money spent on tanks, aircraft and missile launchers. It is also the cost of dependence on foreign arms suppliers, the political inability to build a cross-party consensus on strategic issues, and the cost of time – because, as Gromadziński reminds us, security is a continuous process, "a story without an end," in which no permanent, fixed point of reference is ever reached.