The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine forced Slovakia to confront years of underinvestment in its armed forces. Since 2022, Bratislava has accelerated military modernisation, gradually moved away from Soviet-era equipment and deepened cooperation with NATO. The transformation, however, has exposed a key dilemma: Slovakia is increasing its security through its allies while at the same time remaining heavily dependent on them.
For a long time, Slovakia spent too little on its military, allocating less than 1 percent of GDP to defence before Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. That event triggered a gradual shift in Bratislava's policy, but it was the full-scale invasion in 2022 that became the decisive catalyst for action.
Since then, Slovakia's response has unfolded in two stages. The first, from 2021 to 2023, under the pro-European governments of Eduard Heger and Ľudovít Ódor, was marked by strong support for Kyiv and close alignment with NATO policy. The second began with the return of Robert Fico to power in late 2023, when Slovakia's foreign-policy direction changed. The government placed less emphasis on the Russian threat, strengthened political ties with Moscow and halted state military aid to Ukraine, although commercial deliveries have continued.
Defence projects progressed under all of Slovakia's recent governments. Defence spending first exceeded NATO's 2 percent of GDP target under Eduard Heger's government, which launched a broad wave of procurement and military-capability development. These measures marked a shift away from outdated post-Soviet systems towards equipment compatible with NATO standards.
Many of these steps were linked to Slovakia's military assistance to Ukraine, including the transfer of MiG-29 fighter jets and the S-300 air-defence system. In return, Slovakia negotiated more favourable terms for acquiring modern equipment, including F-16 fighter jets and the German MANTIS air-defence system. The latter was provided to Bratislava as a donation in recognition of its support for Kyiv.
Billions in Plans and a Recruitment Surge
Fico's current government is continuing these projects. A recently published long-term Defence Development Plan to 2040 envisages replacing small arms, tanks, artillery, aircraft, helicopters and other equipment.
In addition to modernising weapons, the document emphasises personnel development. By the end of 2032, Slovakia aims to have an army of 19,300 soldiers, with that figure expected to exceed 25,000 eight years later. The government has also launched a voluntary reserve programme under the National Defence Forces and established a Gendarmerie Corps.
Slovakia successfully produces various types of military equipment domestically. The flagship product of its heavy defence industry is the Zuzana 2 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, manufactured by KONŠTRUKTA-Defence.
Other examples include the Wolf 4×4 multipurpose tactical vehicle produced by Slovak company DefTech and the Božena mine-clearance systems manufactured by WAY Industries.
In lighter equipment, the private sector supplies small arms, including pistols manufactured by Grand Power. Bratislava also plays an important role as an ammunition supplier. Companies such as VOP Nováky and ZVS Holding manufacture 155 mm artillery ammunition and other types of ammunition on a large and competitive industrial scale.
Empty Skies and Dependence on the Alliance
Support for Ukraine nevertheless created temporary gaps in Slovakia's own security. By handing over key military equipment, Bratislava became heavily dependent on its allies for the protection of its airspace.
NATO Air Policing missions and the rotational presence of partner forces – particularly from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands during earlier stages – played a fundamental role in compensating for temporary gaps in air defence.
Today, Czech, Polish and Hungarian aircraft support patrol missions over Slovak territory.
As a small landlocked state on NATO's eastern flank bordering Ukraine, Slovakia remains deeply dependent on the Alliance. NATO plays a central role in Bratislava's defence planning.
The country lacks independent strategic deterrence capabilities and relies on partners for airspace protection, intelligence sharing and contingency planning. Since 2022, Slovakia has also hosted multinational contingents as part of NATO's forward presence, reinforcing its position as a frontline state.
Slovakia's defence procurement is diverse but clearly oriented towards the West. Three major suppliers dominate: the United States, Germany and other European partners, alongside selected non-European suppliers such as Israel.
The United States is carrying out the most important transformation project for the Slovak armed forces through the delivery of F-16 fighter jets. Washington has also supplied Black Hawk helicopters.
Bratislava recently expressed interest in purchasing four additional aircraft from the United States, along with long-range missiles and HIMARS systems.
Germany supplied 15 Leopard tanks in exchange for 30 BVP-1 vehicles sent to Ukraine. Sweden remains a key partner for the purchase of 152 CV90 MkIV tracked infantry fighting vehicles under a 2022 agreement worth almost €1.3 billion.
Israel, meanwhile, is supplying the long-awaited Barak MX air-defence system. The Slovak Armed Forces plan to fully integrate six such batteries by 2030.
The Final Break with Moscow
Slovakia once relied heavily on Russian military technology, but this situation has changed dramatically over the years. The most significant post-Soviet systems were transferred to Ukraine in their entirety.
Several older systems remain in service while the military waits for modern Western replacements. One example is the gradual replacement of Soviet T-72 tanks with German Leopard 2s.
Although Slovakia still operates some equipment based on older Soviet-era technology, it has almost completely severed its logistical dependence on Moscow. Slovakia has retained engineering expertise and is currently using accumulated stocks of spare parts while awaiting deliveries of new Western systems.
Security conditions extend beyond the question of weapons systems themselves. They also affect political autonomy, crisis resilience and credibility among allies.
Slovakia does not possess long-range strategic air defence, satellite reconnaissance or comprehensive ISR capabilities covering intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
As a result, its security architecture relies heavily on NATO, particularly on support from the United States.
According to the Slovak Information Service (SIS), its closest relationships are with intelligence services in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and neighbouring countries, particularly those belonging to the Visegrád Group.
SIS also participates in information exchange within the EU and NATO, is a founding member of the Central European Conference – an international intelligence forum – and joined the Intelligence Academy in Europe in 2025.
As with many countries of comparable size, this situation inevitably reduces Bratislava's room for manoeuvre during crises and limits its operational sovereignty.
On the other hand, integration into NATO's collective defence system significantly strengthens Slovakia's territorial security and deterrence – capabilities that a country of 5.4 million people could not realistically build on its own.
Fico Controversies: Is the West Losing Trust?
Slovakia's increasingly ambiguous foreign policy under Robert Fico has undermined its credibility among Western partners.
This became particularly visible in spring 2024, when the prime minister publicly disclosed confidential discussions among allies concerning the possible deployment of Western troops to Ukraine.
Since then, security experts have repeatedly warned that friendly states have become more cautious about sharing sensitive information with the current government.
In recent years, Bratislava has also found itself on the margins of discussions about key regional initiatives. One example was the so-called "Drone Wall". Slovakia, like Hungary, was initially excluded from negotiations and subsequently had to seek inclusion in the talks.
This creates significant difficulties for the entire defence apparatus, as it remains heavily dependent on access to allied intelligence. Local services simply cannot independently obtain all the information needed to monitor global threats.
Ammunition, Yes. Drones, No. Where Are Bratislava's Weaknesses?
There are genuine efforts to strengthen Slovakia's domestic defence industry.
Slovakia has developed a dynamic defence sector – specialised, though concentrated in selected areas – that compares favourably with other Central European countries.
Companies active in the sector include KONŠTRUKTA-Defence, ZVS Holding, MSM Group, WAY Industries and Kerametal.
Many of them belong to Czechoslovak Group, one of the fastest-growing defence holdings on the continent.
Ammunition production is clearly the strongest asset of Slovakia's domestic industry, making the country one of NATO's leading suppliers of 155 mm artillery shells. The Slovak government is seeking to accelerate this development further.
Under the EU's SAFE programme, a seven-year framework agreement was signed with ZVS Holding, under which Slovakia aims to become a major ammunition hub for the European Union. The agreement has a maximum value of €58 billion. This figure represents the upper limit of potential orders for Slovakia and other EU members, rather than guaranteed government expenditure.
Earlier plans also focused on rebuilding air-defence capabilities, including the acquisition of F-16s, weapons for Black Hawk helicopters and Israeli Barak systems.
However, Slovakia faces serious gaps in counter-drone technology, relying largely on smaller systems such as MANTIS, Igla and selected electronic jammers.
Tomáš Valášek, a former Slovak ambassador to NATO, told euBrief that closing this gap would require a combination of investments in attack helicopters, subsonic aircraft, drones designed to destroy other drones, and a network of acoustic and electronic sensors.
Less is known about the government's efforts to develop cyber-defence capabilities.
The civil-protection system is frequently criticised for deep neglect, while pro-Russian narratives promoted by some representatives of the current government further contribute to public confusion.
The main obstacle to developing these areas is a lack of funding, with politicians repeatedly citing the need for broader fiscal consolidation. Another problem, as Valášek also points out, is the limited production capacity of Slovakia's domestic defence industry.
The Trap of New Dependencies
The rearmament process is therefore creating a new framework of dependencies, particularly around key technology suppliers such as the United States and other NATO partners.
Such strong links can create strategic risks, especially when political changes in allied capitals affect the predictability of long-term defence cooperation and future procurement.
On the other hand, these relationships significantly strengthen interoperability and deepen integration within NATO itself. Shared systems, logistics and training frameworks improve collective-defence capabilities and coordination during crises.
Ultimately, the key question is not whether Slovakia can achieve full defence autonomy – for a country of its size, that remains entirely unrealistic.
The real question is whether deeper cooperation will genuinely increase its resilience to threats, or whether growing political uncertainty along the Danube will weaken the trust of Western partners on which the entire security architecture depends.
