U.S. expert on Eastern Europe Lucian Kim and Ukrainian analyst Hlib Fishchenko reflect on the current state and future outlook of Slovak-Ukrainian relations. Fishchenko deems that despite all the tensions, Ukrainians still differentiate between ordinary Slovaks and their pro-Russian government.
Written by Natália Silenská, Euractiv.sk
While government changes are routine in democracies, a radical shift in foreign policy is more of an exception. Yet, that’s precisely what happened to Slovakia’s approach to Ukraine following the parliamentary elections in autumn 2023.
Whereas the previous pro-European cabinet of Eduard Heger (Democrats) belonged to Ukraine’s vocal supporters and actively deepened bilateral ties, the fourth government of Robert Fico (Smer-SD) reversed course immediately upon taking office.
Fico’s ruling coalition is widely viewed as pro-Russian due to its verbal attacks on President Volodymyr Zelensky, criticism of military aid to Ukraine, and repeated meetings with Russian officials.
Therefore, its relations with Kyiv have been tense for months and reached a critical low early this year, when Ukraine suspended the transit of Russian gas through its territory. Slovakia’s PM responded by threatening retaliatory measures, including halting electricity supplies and reducing assistance for Ukrainians in Slovakia, if the transit is not renewed.
The latest blow to bilateral ties came when Slovakia blocked the EU’s 18th package of sanctions against Russia – all while Ukraine continues to defend itself against Russia’s unprovoked, and increasingly brutal aggression, now entering its fourth year.
As a result of Fico’s positions, Slovakia has also grown progressively isolated within Europe, losing its seat at important decision-making tables, such as the coalition of the willing.
Euractiv Slovakia spoke with two foreign analysts to see how they view current relations between the two countries – not just at the governmental level, but also among ordinary people. They also discussed whether the diplomatic damage can still be repaired.
Cooperation continues despite all the tensions
“Relations between Kyiv and Bratislava worsened significantly after Fico’s return to office in 2023, in large part because of his opposition to aiding Ukraine militarily and his friendliness toward the Kremlin. Ukraine, however, also has difficult relations with its other EU neighbours,” says Lucian Kim, a U.S. expert on Russia and Ukraine from the International Crisis Group.
Kim has been covering Eastern Europe for over two decades and is the author of Putin’s Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine (2024). He reminded Euractiv that Slovakia isn’t the only country Kyiv struggles with.
“Hungary is the most obvious example, but Ukraine has many points of contention with Poland and Romania as well. Kyiv’s challenge is to keep its neighbours on board despite economic disagreements and lingering historical disputes,” he adds.
To varying degrees, Ukraine is managing to do just that — including in its ties with Slovakia. As Hlib Fishchenko, director of the Ukrainian Institute for European Security Studies, points out, Slovak-Ukrainian relations have not come to a standstill despite the tensions.
He notes that even after the change in government, the two countries still cooperate on a number of state- or municipality-level programs. Euractiv Slovakia recently reported that many Slovak cities and regions maintain long-standing partnerships with Ukrainian counterparts, providing ongoing support and collaborating on cross-border projects like Interreg VI-A NEXT.
Military cooperation also hasn’t stopped. “We are purchasing a lot of weapons from Slovakia, and I’m grateful we still have that option,” says Fishchenko.
Before the elections, Fico declared he would not allow “a single more bullet” to be sent to Ukraine. But according to SME, in less than a year under his government, Slovakia has exported weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment to Ukraine worth at least €112 million.
Fishchenko says the two most significant moments of tension in bilateral relations came when Fico “dared to go to Moscow” — first time in December 2024, and again in May 2025 for Russia’s propaganda-filled Victory Day celebration, where he was the only EU leader in attendance.
By taking part in that ceremony, Fishchenko says, “Fico betrayed Ukraine 1,500 times.” Among the 11,000 soldiers who marched through Red Square that day, 1,500 had previously fought against Ukraine.
Fico’s attendance also helped legitimize Vladimir Putin, who is under international indictment for the abduction of at least 20,000 Ukrainian children. “But Fico nevertheless shook his hand and that angered Ukrainians,” Fishchenko adds.
Ukrainians still differentiate between Fico government and Slovaks
Fiščenko was born in Kyiv but completed his university studies in Slovakia. He says that, before the war, relations between ordinary Slovaks and Ukrainians were marked by a lack of awareness.
“For ordinary Ukrainians — especially those outside border towns like Uzhhorod or Mukachevo — it was hard to even guess where Slovakia was on the map,” he claims with a touch of irony. That changed after the Russian invasion, thanks to the proactive stance of Slovakia’s previous government.
Slovakia was among the first countries that didn’t hesitate to send military and humanitarian aid. According to analyst, this caught the attention of many ordinary Ukrainians. A major turning point, he says, was the donation of Slovak MiG-29 fighter jets. According to him, this sparked great awe in Ukraine.
“It gave us hope,” Fishchenko recalls. “It was such an extraordinary help from a such a small country — one the size of two Odesa Oblasts. That’s when we began to respect and appreciate Slovakia.”
Ukrainians started paying closer attention to Bratislava again when its government changed. Fishchenko admits that he initially dismissed Fico’s pro-Russian rhetoric as mere campaign talk aimed at mobilizing voters: “I was wrong.”
Currently, he considers Slovakia’s recent decision to block EU sanctions as the government’s most damaging move. Even though it has lifted its veto already, postponement of sanctions allows Russia to maintain financial resources that fund weapons production, including Iskander-M missiles. “Every further delay means Russia can build more missiles that are used against Ukrainians,” he says.
While Fico’s government has harmed Slovakia’s image in Ukraine to some extent, Fishchenko still views people-to-people relations as non-problematic.
He also emphasizes that Ukrainians continue to distinguish between the Slovak government and Slovak citizens. One major reason, he says, was this year’s mass pro-European protests in Slovakia.
“We saw what the Peace for Ukraine initiative did, and how your people took to the streets. Footage of those rallies got millions of views on Ukrainian social media. It showed that Slovaks stood up,” analyst told Euractiv Slovakia.
“We also saw [Slovak opposition leader] Michal Šimečka visiting Kyiv and shaking hands with Zelensky. So yes, we understand there’s a strong opposition in Slovakia – it’s just not united,” he adds.
Kyiv is pragmatic – and likely to move past the diplomatic fallout
According to Lucian Kim, the damage Fico has done to bilateral ties is repairable. If a pro-Ukraine government were to return to power in Slovakia, Kim believes Kyiv would gladly accept an outstretched hand.
“The fact that Fico’s predecessors were so staunchly pro-Ukrainian is an indication that the political pendulum can swing back again in Slovakia. Volodymyr Zelensky’s government is pragmatic and happy for all the support it can get, so it is unlikely that Fico can do lasting damage to the bilateral relationship,” Kim states.
Asked whether Slovakia might be currently undermining its chances to take part in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction due to its many pro-Russian controversies, both analysts say it’s too early to tell.
Economists frequently point out that rebuilding Ukraine will present major opportunities for Slovak companies.
“The role Slovakia will play in Ukraine’s reconstruction largely depends on what government is in power in Bratislava when the guns fall silent,” Kim notes.
In an interview with Euractiv Slovakia last October, EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová said reconstruction efforts are already underway, as infrastructure and buildings in Ukraine must be repaired “on the go.” However, once the war ends, “the pace will be completely different.”
“There will be a need to rebuild a war-ravaged country — from small-scale repairs to major infrastructure. New businesses will emerge, jobs will be created, and there will be enormous opportunities. But Ukrainians will be most grateful to those who are helping them now,” Mathernová said.
She added that Slovakia traditionally enjoyed a very good reputation in Ukraine thanks to its early and decisive support. However, it is not seizing current opportunities as it could. She urged Slovak businesses to come and launch their projects now — before the competition becomes overwhelming.
Fishchenko echoes that call, encouraging those interested to start building in relatively safer western regions of Ukraine. But he emphasizes that the crucial task at the moment is to make sure there is anything left to rebuild.
“We’re at a point of time where we don’t even know whether Ukraine and its statehood will survive. Because the Russians won’t stop,” he warns. “So right now, that’s what matters most. We need to survive.”
The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
The project is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.
