More than 80 years after Volhynia and decades after Operation “Vistula,” historical wounds still shape Polish-Ukrainian relations. This summer brought new acts of remembrance on both sides, amid hopes for reconciliation and fresh tensions in the present.
Written by Barabara Bodalska, Euractiv.pl
The shared history of Poles and Ukrainians is often perceived as a source of division rather than unity. In Poland, public debate frequently recalls the so-called Volhynia massacre, while in Ukraine, memories focus on the post-war forced resettlements.
This situation is frequently attributed to, among other factors, nationalist sentiment within both nations and the commemorations of the most painful chapters of their modern history.
This year, on 11 July, Poland marked its first National Day of Remembrance for Poles — Victims of Genocide committed by the OUN and UPA in the eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic.
Just five days later, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law officially recognising as victims of deportation those Ukrainians who were forcibly resettled from Poland to Ukraine between 1944 and 1951, including during Operation “Vistula.”
National holiday on 11 July
In July, President Andrzej Duda signed legislation establishing 11 July as a national holiday.
“Only on the basis of truth — even the most difficult truth — can mature and sincere relations between nations, including between Poles and Ukrainians, be built,” the president wrote on the X platform.
“This is one of the most tragic experiences in our history. 11 July 1943 was the day when a ruthless crime reached its culmination. Our defenceless compatriots — ordinary people, civilians, innocent victims, often murdered in churches while attending Sunday Mass — were killed at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists. They were murdered because they were Poles,” Duda recalled.
“Let truth, forgiveness and peace replace past evil and oblivion.”
In his address for the National Day of Remembrance, the president described the Volhynia events as “one of the greatest tragedies in the history of our nation.”
“Compassion for those who lost loved ones in Volhynia more than 80 years ago, and deep sorrow for those who suffered a cruel death, are joined in our hearts with the painful conviction that basic justice has still not been done. Today, we once again ask ourselves how such a great tragedy could have occurred between two nations so close to each other,” Duda wrote.
“The Polish state has an inalienable duty to ensure a dignified burial for the murdered, to at least partially ease the pain of their surviving relatives and descendants,” he added.
According to Duda, “the time has come for the most painful chapter in Polish-Ukrainian history to be documented and closed through the joint efforts of the relevant authorities and institutions of both states.”
The president expressed his conviction that “recognition of the truth about the martyrdom of Poles in Volhynia will become the foundation for peace and friendship between our nations — a bond so strong that no hostile force will be able to break it.”
“I trust that mutual goodwill, respect for historical facts, understanding, and solidarity in the face of common threats will help to overcome the immense pain, grief and sense of injustice left by the Volhynia crime. Eternal memory to the murdered! May the evil of the past and oblivion be replaced by truth, forgiveness and peace!” he appealed in his letter to those attending the commemoration.
Duda: If someone doesn't like it, we'll close the Rzeszów airport
Just two days earlier, on 9 July, President Duda told right-wing media outlets (Otwartej Konserwy, Nowy Ład and Klub Jagielloński) that both Ukraine and Poland’s Western allies treat Polish logistical resources as though they were “their property.” He warned that Poland could close the airport in Jasionka near Rzeszów — a key hub for delivering aid to Ukraine — at any time.
“I believe that both Ukrainians and our allies simply think the Rzeszów airport and our motorways belong to them — excuse me — as if they were theirs. Well, they are not theirs, they are ours. If someone doesn’t like it, we’ll close it and say goodbye. Yes, we’ll say we’re doing renovations,” he said.
“We’ll close the airport in Rzeszów, and you can deliver aid to Ukraine by sea, by air, drop it by parachute — figure it out. If you think you don’t need us, then figure something out,” Duda stated firmly, suggesting such measures could serve as leverage in negotiations with Western partners.
Polejowski:We just want to find, exhume and identify our ancestors
Karol Polejowski, deputy president of the Institute of National Remembrance (whose president-elect is Karol Nawrocki), stressed that “the Polish state, of which the Institute of National Remembrance is a part, expects Ukraine to finally address this painful issue from our history.”
“Our aim is to find, exhume and identify our ancestors who still lie in unmarked graves, to return these remains to their families, and to give them a dignified Christian burial,” he said during the 11 July commemorations.
Polejowski recalled that “almost 120,000 innocent Polish victims still rest in unmarked mass graves in Ukraine.” At the time of the Volhynia massacre, 346,600 Poles — 16.6% of the total population — lived in the region, making them the second-largest ethnic group.
Ukraine: Post-war displacement of Ukrainians from Poland was unlawful
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has adopted a law officially recognising as victims of deportation those Ukrainians forcibly displaced from Poland between 1944 and 1951.
“This is the restoration of historical justice for those forcibly removed from Zakerzonia, Chełmszczyzna, Łemkowszczyzna, Podlasie and Nadsania,” announced Iryna Herashchenko, deputy head of the Ukrainian parliament, on social media.
According to the parliament’s website, the bill was backed by 284 MPs, with none voting against or abstaining. Forty-two MPs did not take part in the vote.
The forced resettlement of ethnic Ukrainians from Poland to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was declared an illegal and criminal act that violated human rights. The law states that the decision was made in 1944 by totalitarian communist regimes.
The legislation grants deportee status both to displaced persons and their descendants, and provides compensation for material and moral losses in the form of an annual lump-sum payment.
The bill’s authors estimate that nearly 700,000 people were deported from ethnically Ukrainian lands incorporated into Poland, including approximately 150,000 who were relocated to northern and north-western Poland in 1947 during Operation “Vistula.”
Poles on the Volhynia massacre
A CBOS survey conducted over two years ago found that almost all Poles had already heard about the wartime crimes in Volhynia. Researchers noted that public awareness of these events had grown rapidly in recent years.
When asked if they had heard about the “Volhynia massacre,” 92% answered “yes” — 64% said they had “heard a lot about it,” and 28% said they had “heard something about it.” Only 8% said they “knew nothing” about the matter.
“The percentage of Poles who have heard about the Volhynia massacre is growing rapidly. Fifteen years ago, just over half (59%) of respondents had heard about it; now it is almost the entire population (92%). Even compared with five years ago, there has been a clear 11-point increase,” CBOS noted in its 2023 report.
Shared history tends to divide, but reconciliation is possible
When asked whether the shared history of Poles and Ukrainians tends to unite or divide the two nations, more than half (53%) said that past events divide them, while 31% believed they unite them. Sixteen percent had no opinion.
At the same time, an overwhelming majority (78%) believed that reconciliation between the two nations is possible — 64% saying it is “rather possible” and 14% “completely possible.”
This represents a 14-point increase from five years earlier, when only 64% thought reconciliation was achievable. By contrast, 12% considered reconciliation “rather impossible,” 2% “completely impossible,” and 8% could not say.
As for current Polish-Ukrainian relations, 54% rated them “rather good,” 10% “definitely good,” and 27% “neither good nor bad.” Only 3% described them as “rather bad,” 1% as “definitely bad,” and 4% had no opinion.
“The percentage of Poles who view relations positively has more than doubled since 2018 (64% compared to 29% five years ago), undoubtedly due to the rapprochement between our nations following the Russian invasion,” CBOS emphasised.
“It is worth noting that a clear increase in positive assessments was also recorded after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Only 4% of Poles currently view bilateral relations negatively,” the report added.
The survey was conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre between 5 and 18 June 2023, using a mixed-mode procedure, on a representative sample of 1,054 adults.
What do Ukrainians think about Poles?
According to research conducted in February by the Mieroszewski Centre, Ukrainians’ attitudes towards Poles have been shaped not only by historical issues, but also by recent economic and political tensions — most notably the agricultural blockades at the Polish-Ukrainian border.
Despite this, the study shows that Poland remains highly rated on the “map of Ukrainian sympathies” due to cultural proximity.
While sympathy for Poland and Poles has decreased since the blockades, historical disputes — including the unresolved questions surrounding the Volhynia massacre — are no longer seen as the main obstacle to normalising relations. Most Ukrainians support the exhumation of Polish victims in western Ukraine.
In the survey, 46% of Ukrainians named Poland as the country closest to them culturally, far ahead of Belarus (9%) and Slovakia (5%).
However, positive opinions of Poles have fallen sharply in recent years: in 2022, 83% of Ukrainians viewed Poles favourably, compared with only 41% in November 2024. The number of respondents with a neutral opinion has grown accordingly.
Researchers interpret this as evidence of a pragmatic relationship, with sentiment fluctuating during periods of economic tension, such as the “grain crisis.” Despite this decline, negative opinions about Poland remain low at just 5%.
Divided not only by history, but also by the present
Ukrainian political scientist Serhiy Taran highlighted the impact of the border blockades on public perception. “Ukraine is fighting not only for itself, but for Europe — and here Poles are setting up blockades,” he said.
“In a country where memories of Stalin’s 1930s famine remain vivid, the sight of spilled grain was a shock,” he noted, calling this the first major factor in the recent deterioration of Poland’s image in Ukraine.
Historical disputes — especially over the exhumation of Volhynia massacre victims — remain important in bilateral relations. Surveys show that one-third of Ukrainians support the unconditional resumption of exhumation work, while 40% believe it should only take place after Poland meets certain conditions.
“Volhynia is not the only grievance,” said political scientist Yevhen Mahda. “There is also the history of the war for Ukrainian independence in 1917–1920, when Ukrainians first fought the Poles for Lviv, and later became their allies against the Bolsheviks, defeating Budyonny’s troops near Zamość. The end of this cooperation was not optimistic: Ukrainian soldiers were interned in Poland as a result of the Polish-Bolshevik peace in Riga. There were also pacifications by the Polish police in Ukrainian-populated areas of the Second Polish Republic.”
Mahda stressed that such historical problems cannot be ignored, but neither should they be exaggerated. “The more we promote the positive elements of our shared history, the more these unpleasant episodes will — if not disappear — then at least take on a different meaning,” he argued.
“Most Poles are aware that their independence is currently being defended by Ukrainian soldiers. In Kyiv, we remember that in 1991 Poland was the first country in the world to recognise Ukraine’s independence,” he added.
Taran also urged a forward-looking approach: “Let us now try to look to the future — without forgetting the past.”
Is Ukrainian nationalism to blame for everything?
Historian, journalist and long-time president of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, Piotr Tyma, pointed out that the prevailing narrative often assumes Ukrainian nationalism has always been the root cause of Polish-Ukrainian tensions — just as it was portrayed in the Second Polish Republic.
In his view, the notion of a Ukrainian threat and “fifth column” remains popular today, with the authorities repeating tropes once used by the communists.
“Paradoxically, fighting the Ukrainians was very convenient for the authorities. Part of Polish society was strongly fixated on the Ukrainian threat,” Tyma said, referring to the post-war clashes with the UPA and the displacement of Ukrainians from the Bieszczady region.
“What is particularly unjust is that after 1989, the issue of the Volhynia crimes was linked to Operation Vistula,” he added, recalling his own family’s experiences.
Tyma stressed that Operation Vistula affected Polish citizens who often had nothing to do with the Ukrainian state, and argued that the campaign to dismantle Ukrainian identity in Poland was largely successful. He also noted that Polish nationalism is a reality that cannot be ignored.
The Volhynia massacre
Eighty-two years ago, on 11 and 12 July 1943, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) carried out coordinated attacks on around 150 Polish-inhabited towns and villages in the Włodzimierz, Horochów, Kowel and Łuck districts of the former Volhynia Province. They struck when people were gathered for Sunday Mass on 11 July.
This “Bloody Sunday” is considered the peak of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1945. More than 100,000 Poles were killed in these actions.
The perpetrators included members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – Bandera faction (OUN-B), the UPA, and local Ukrainians they incited — often neighbours or even relatives of the victims. The criminal order is attributed to UPA commander-in-chief Roman Shukhevych.
The OUN-UPA described their actions as an “anti-Polish campaign” aimed at making Ukraine ethnically homogeneous.
Operation "Vistula"
In spring 1947, Poland’s communist authorities deported non-Polish populations from the south-eastern part of the country. Over a three-month period, about 140,000 Ukrainians and Lemkos were forcibly resettled to the “Recovered Territories” in the west and north.
This military action, codenamed Operation “Vistula,” was conducted alongside anti-UPA operations that ultimately crushed the Ukrainian guerrilla movement. According to official figures, the UPA lost 1,135 members during the operation, including 543 killed.
As the historical portal Dzieje.pl notes, Operation “Vistula” was intended to “finally solve the Ukrainian problem in Poland” by eliminating UPA units and evacuating all persons of Ukrainian nationality from border regions, dispersing them thinly across the new territories. The policy covered all “shades of Ukrainian nationality, including Lemkos,” and applied even to mixed Polish-Ukrainian families.
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