Ukraine’s ambitious bid for European Union membership, alongside other candidate countries, faces formidable challenges. While formal accession negotiations have commenced for many of them, their progress is deeply contingent on continued reforms within these nations and the EU’s ability to achieve internal consensus on further enlargement.
Written by Aleksandra Krzysztoszek, Euractiv.pl
Ukraine’s ambition to join the European Union represents one of the most complex and strategically significant enlargement processes in the bloc’s history. Initiated amidst the ongoing conflict with Russia, this path is profoundly shaped by the realities of war, including the immense challenges of post-war reconstruction and the critical need for security guarantees.
While Ukraine has begun formal accession negotiations, its journey is inherently linked to its ability to continue comprehensive reforms and rebuild, even as hostilities persist.
The prospect of accession of new members also brings to light substantial challenges within the EU itself. Achieving genuine consensus among the current 27 member states on issues of enlargement, internal institutional reforms, and the significant budgetary implications remains a formidable task.
Historical models of rapid “big bang” expansions appear less likely given the current geopolitical landscape and differing national priorities. Overcoming these internal divisions and ensuring the necessary alignment of legislation and institutions with EU standards will define whether and how quickly new countries can advance towards their European future.
The discussion of challenges resulting from EU enlargement and the prospects of candidate countries, especially Ukraine, to join the bloc was held by panelists at the conference Fortress or Frontier? The EU’s Enlargement Dilemma by EURACTIV.pl.
Ukraine’s EU path war’s shadow
”Regarding Ukraine, the current outlook for EU accession is rather bleak. And this isn’t just about Ukraine—everything now boils down to winning the war”, said Daniel Szeligowski, Head of Eastern Europe Programme in the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).
He recalled the conditions under which Ukraine was granted EU candidate status. “It all started with the Russian invasion. Unfortunately, this is the point of departure for the entire process, and it remains crucial even when we discuss Ukraine’s EU accession, post-war reconstruction, and recovery,” he insisted.
Szeligowski believes that the extent of Ukraine’s current destruction directly correlates with the ease of its future EU accession, meaning less war damage now will result in less rebuilding later and a smoother path to meeting accession criteria.
The expert highlighted Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, its mutual defense clause, asserting it’s even stronger than NATO’s Article 5.
“That brings us to the issue of security guarantees. Right now, very few—if any—European countries are willing to provide such guarantees to Ukraine. Without addressing the link between security guarantees and the war, it will be very difficult for Ukraine to advance on the EU accession path,” he said.
As he explained, some nations contend that security guarantees for Ukraine can only be addressed once the war concludes. Others, including the expert himself, maintain that these guarantees should precede the war’s end.
“That could make it easier to end the war, since Ukraine would then know the conditions under which it will operate. But this dilemma remains unresolved, and it significantly complicates matters for Ukraine,” Szeligowski stressed.
“I often tell my Ukrainian colleagues that if they join the EU in 10 years—which was more or less the timeline for Poland—that would actually be a success. It’s an optimistic scenario, not a pessimistic one, and shouldn’t be seen as obstruction. There’s still a long road ahead,” he concluded.
Pavol Demeš, Slovak Foreign Policy Analyst, Former Minister of International Relations, called Ukraine one of the most fascinating examples when it comes to enlargement.
“This is a country at war, fighting for its very existence, and over the past three and a half years, it has surprised us all,” he said. “Even under wartime conditions, the EU decided to open accession negotiations. And we don’t know when and how this war will end.”
Agreeing with Szeligowski, Demeš stated that the trajectory of Ukraine’s EU path depends on the war’s end. “How the war ends, how Russia behaves in the coming months, how the US and Russia contribute to the settlement—these will be key,” he said.
Hungary blocks EU enlargement
Nataliya Vinnykova, head of the Department of International Relations at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, highlighted that formal accession negotiations with Ukraine, initiated in June 2024, have now completed their first year.
She also noted that these negotiations are organised into clusters and chapters, requiring each candidate country to align its laws and institutions with EU standards.
As of June 2025, Ukraine has submitted the first screening report on Cluster 1—called the “Fundamentals” cluster—which includes judiciary reform, the rule of law, and public administration, she pointed out, adding that reports on Cluster 2 (Internal Market) and Cluster 6 (External Relations) are expected to be submitted by the end of this month.
“The screening process—which involves a self-assessment of legal alignment—is expected to conclude by autumn 2025. That is the optimistic scenario. But there are real obstacles”, she noted.
The biggest obstacle, she noted, is Hungary, currently blocking the opening of two negotiation clusters slated for June. “This is delaying the process significantly,” she admitted.
Vinnykova stressed that Hungary has presented 11 recommendations, many focused on language requirements, with the primary demand being the elimination of state language proficiency requirements for public officials.
“Hungary insists that Ukrainian officials should not be legally required to speak the national language, even in official settings such as council meetings. This is one of the most controversial points,” she explained.
The expert stated that Hungary additionally sought to impose a requirement on Ukraine for guaranteed representation of national minorities in its parliament.
“However, for now, this demand appears to be politically unfeasible, as it would require constitutional changes—something that cannot happen without a nationwide referendum in Ukraine. Significant constitutional amendments would be needed,” she insisted.
“So, what we have at the moment is a fast-paced screening process. Ukraine, especially the government, is working to advance this process. But at the same time, Hungary has not yet withdrawn its veto on opening the first negotiation cluster.”
Vinnykova added that in the current geopolitical climate, “it’s difficult to claim that negotiations have truly begun—let alone envision a full and comprehensive accession process.”
“After all, Ukraine is still in a state of war,” she emphasised.
Consensus is missing
The Hungarian stance illustrates a deficiency in genuine consensus among EU member states regarding the issue of enlargement.
“Despite many declarations, I don’t yet see real alignment among capitals on Ukraine’s accession prospects. Declarations are one thing; real policy is another,” Szeligowski said.
Jan Kovář, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, shared the other speakers’ skepticism about a quick EU accession process, citing a lack of consensus on both EU institutional reform and enlargement itself.
“The disagreement spans multiple levels: from structural reforms and institutional functioning to specific policy issues that carry high fiscal costs, such as agriculture and cohesion funding,” he said.
“There are only a few major funding mechanisms, but they’re all sensitive topics—particularly for the current net beneficiaries of the EU budget. And if you introduce new, relatively poorer member states, something has to give,” he stressed, adding that either the EU budget has to grow, which he doubted there was a consensus for, or existing policies must be restructured or redirected, which would inevitably mean consequences for current recipients.
In many EU countries, including his native Czech Republic, the bloc’s membership was often promoted as an economic deal—a sort of “cash cow,” Kovář said, insisting that the EU was framed as a “rich husband.”
“It was never really about shared values or political union; it was always a marriage of convenience,” he pointed out. “I think this narrative was a mistake. Because if you take the money away, public support evaporates—both for the EU itself and for its enlargement.”
He cited recent Eurobarometer data showing relatively low public support for enlargement in Czechia, despite the rhetorical political backing it receives.
“Now imagine telling people, ‘There will be no more funds, no more financial benefits.’ That narrative won’t go down well,” he said.
Rebuilding EU unity is key
In 2004, the four countries of the Visegrad Four joined the EU during the “Big Bang enlargement.”
“At that time, we all had very similar motivations and attitudes toward the EU,” said Demeš. “For us, it was a matter of modernisation—of joining a club that we felt we belonged to. It gave us momentum for development and reforms.”
Simultaneously, the EU welcomed new members, largely believing that enlargement served the Union’s interests as much as the new states’, he added.He noted that EU accession was happening alongside NATO integration—”so the political, economic, military, and security dimensions were all closely connected.”
“At that time, there was strong unity—both among the countries joining and those accepting us into the EU and the broader transatlantic community. We didn’t face significant opposition.”
“Today, when we talk about further enlargement—whether for Eastern Partnership countries or the Western Balkans—we’re dealing with an entirely different geopolitical landscape.”
Even Washington, a former champion of Euroatlantic integration, has profoundly changed its stance, the expert noted. “If the President of the United States is saying the EU was created to screw America, then we’re clearly dealing with a completely different foreign policy paradigm when we talk about the EU and further enlargement,” he pointed out.
According to Demeš, the war in Ukraine exposed V4 fragmentation, with Hungary and Slovakia taking a different stance on Ukraine and Russia than Poland and the Czech Republic. “We’re no longer able to speak with a common voice on enlargement or on the war in Ukraine,” he said.
“Rebuilding unity, both at the regional and the EU level, is a shared sense of purpose—keeping the EU together and supporting those knocking on the door—is a primary task for all of us: policymakers, think tankers.”
No “big bang” enlargement
Kovář doesn’t anticipate any more “big bang” EU enlargements like the one in 2004. “It’s simply not feasible without internal reforms. Politicians in Western Europe won’t be able to convince their electorates to support enlargement—whether via parliamentary votes or referendums—unless the EU first fixes its internal structures,” he explained.
“That said, maybe we’ll see a “salami slice” approach—one country at a time. But even that has its limits. I don’t believe you can integrate all nine candidate countries that way.”
He said that if he had to guess, Montenegro could be next to join the EU, as it’s small and manageable in terms of population and economy. He added that North Macedonia or Albania could perhaps follow, but after that, the process would likely stall again.
“Frankly, I’d be surprised if more than two countries join the EU before 2030. And I certainly don’t expect a large country like Ukraine to join by then,” he remarked.
Szeligowski also brought upon the topic of the next, post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, which he said could be the framework to prepare the Union for enlargement. “The following MFF, post-2034, could then support an already enlarged Union,” he pointed out.
Ukraine needs reforms, capacity, support
To a question about what Ukraine needs to facilitate its EU path, Vinnykova pointed out that financial aid “is, of course, essential—and the EU is already the largest donor to Ukraine—but support goes far beyond just money”.
What Ukraine urgently needs now is human capital—staff capable of implementing the reforms essential for EU integration, she remarked, adding that special training campaigns would profoundly help.
“And yes, we have to be honest: there is currently a serious shortage of tailored expertise—specific knowledge for each sector, each chapter of the accession negotiations.”
Szeligowski pointed to two parallel tracks: one is the accession procedure, and the other is preparation for accession. “These tracks run simultaneously. That means even if the accession process is blocked, it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be preparing Ukraine for eventual membership. We mustn’t wait for the Hungarian veto to be lifted before getting to work,” the expert said.
When asked how Ukraine could advance its EU accession, he pointed to three key steps, the first being meeting the accession criteria through essential reforms.
He used a metaphor of traveling on a Polish train. “You go to the station, you never know exactly when the train will come, but you’re pretty sure it will—eventually,” he said. “But you have to be there when it does. And more importantly, you need to have a ticket. That ticket is reform. When the train arrives, it won’t wait. You need to be ready to board immediately.”
That’s what happened in 2022 when Ukraine was granted EU candidate status, Szeligowski explained, adding that “it didn’t happen just because of geopolitics—there had to be a foundation.”
“Reforms in previous years gave the EU a basis to act. So Ukraine must stay on that reform path, even though I know how hard and painful the economic reforms will be. But no one expects Ukraine to be ready for accession tomorrow. That’s important to remember,” Szeligowski said.
The second thing is building institutional capacity. “There’s a massive body of EU law and practice that needs to be adopted. This isn’t a negotiation. Apart from a few opt-outs or transition periods, there’s very little flexibility. Accession is mostly about implementation, not haggling over terms,”
Thirdly, the accession treaty—no matter how good—will not be enough, according to Szeligowski. “It still has to be ratified by all 27 member states. Today you might be able to negotiate a workaround for the Hungarian veto to open a cluster or two. But that won’t cut it when it comes to final ratification,” the panelist said.
That’s why Ukraine has to follow Poland’s example, he added. ”During our accession process, we launched a major public relations campaign in every EU member state—to persuade both governments and societies that admitting Poland would bring value to the EU,” he said.
“Ukrainian politicians often really believe that it only takes an approval of Berlin or Paris to join the EU. But it doesn’t work like that. Ukraine has to engage all 27 countries—one by one—and convince them that it deserves to join the Union.”
The project is co-financed by the governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.
The project is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.
