Slovakia is one of the EU’s most vulnerable countries to disinformation, much of which is now being amplified even by its own government. Experts warn that instead of countering Russian propaganda, Slovakia’s leadership is using it as a political tool to gain and maintain power.
Written by Natália Silenská | EURACTIV.sk
Disinformation about the war in Ukraine is one of Slovakia’s most widespread narratives. As in other parts of the EU, this surge began after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, when Moscow escalated its hybrid warfare through aggressive disinformation.
The same strategy was employed and escalated after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Moscow's primary goal is not to convince people of its narrative but to flood the information space with conflicting stories, creating uncertainty and mistrust in society.
Slovakia is particularly susceptible to Kremlin-led disinformation for three main reasons: First, Slovak society is the most prone to believe in conspiracy theories among the CEE countries. Moreover, only 25 percent of Slovaks trust the media.
Second, pro-Russian actors are highly active within Slovakia. A striking example is the Russian Embassy in Bratislava, which is the most active on Facebook among all EU embassies.
Since Robert Fico’s (Smer-SD/NI) return to power in October 2023, pro-Kremlin narratives have taken root in Slovakia’s highest government offices, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the majority of ministries.
As a result, statements that European politicians refute as clear Russian propaganda find strong advocates within Slovakia’s political elite.
Euractiv Slovakia examined the defining elements of Slovakia's susceptibility to pro-Kremlin disinformation, the government's embrace of such rhetoric, and the country's reluctance to utilize EU tools designed to counteract it.
Spreading propaganda out of conviction or political calculation?
Prime Minister Robert Fico and several members of his government have gained notoriety for their increasingly frequent meetings with Russian officials and regular use of Kremlin-friendly rhetoric.
Slovak government figures have blamed the EU, NATO, and even Ukraine itself for the war, while also spreading repeatedly debunked disinformation, for example, the claim that “Ukrainian Nazis are killing Russian-speaking civilians in Donbas.”
One of the most frequently repeated pro-Russian narratives adopted by the Slovak government is the call for “peace.”
Unlike the broader EU stance, which acknowledges that peace requires Ukraine to defend itself, Slovak leaders argue that a military solution is impossible. They claim that sending weapons to Ukraine only prolongs the war and have called for an end to military aid.
In truth, if Russia stops fighting, the war ends; if Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ceases to exist as we know it.
It remains unclear whether Fico’s government genuinely believes in these narratives or if they are merely using them as a calculated strategy to win over nationalist and far-right voters. According to disinformation expert Peter Dubóczi from Infosecurity.sk and the Department of Political Science at Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, it has become difficult to tell.
“Anti-Ukraine narratives have been circulating in Slovakia for years. In 2014, a kind of ‘fifth column’ emerged, which prepared a part of Slovak society to be open to Russian propaganda,” he explained to EURACTIV Slovakia, adding that these narratives have since gained a mobilizing quality.
He points out that after the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in 2018, and the departure of popular Peter Pellegrini from Smer-SD in 2020, Fico’s party saw its support plummet. It was then that Smer MEP Ľuboš Blaha’s aggressive disinformation campaigns “showed the way forward.”
“What might have started as pragmatism is now difficult to separate from genuine belief. It’s hard to generalize across the entire ruling coalition, but in my opinion, some key politicians have genuinely come to believe that this is the right course of action,” Dubóczi adds.
According to him, the fundamental goal of Russia's information war has therefore been “unfortunately very successful in Slovakia,” as it has managed to both influence public opinion and even find politicians willing to promote the Kremlin's interests.
Fico vs. Orbán – same but different?
Despite its strong anti-Ukraine rhetoric, the Slovak government avoided taking drastic action against Kyiv. Unlike Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who has repeatedly vetoed EU decisions on Ukraine, Fico has mostly confined his opposition to rhetoric.
“Fico is far more extreme in his rhetoric than in his actual foreign policy,” Péter Krekó, director of the Hungarian think tank Political Capital, told EURACTIV Slovakia in October.
The Slovak government has never seriously considered vetoing EU decisions on Ukraine or sanctions against Russia. Orbán, on the other hand, has done so multiple times and has tried to persuade Fico to join him.
However, this distinction has begun to blur. Bratislava’s attacks on Kyiv escalated sharply after Ukraine halted Russian gas transit through its territory.
Following his December 2024 meeting with Vladimir Putin, Fico launched a communications offensive, pressuring Ukraine to resume gas transit and arguing that its suspension harmed the Slovak economy.
In turn, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Fico of opening a “second energy front” against Ukraine under Putin’s orders. This led to a series of heated public exchanges between Fico and Zelenskyy in early 2025. The spat resulted in direct threats against the war-torn state.
Highlighting the war narrative, sidestepping the refugee topic
Fico began threatening to cut electricity supplies to Ukraine, veto EU assistance, halt humanitarian aid, and even revoke benefits for Ukrainian war refugees in Slovakia. While these threats were never carried out, they marked a noticeable shift, as, for the first time, the Slovak government directly and notably targeted Ukrainian refugees as part of its political messaging.
Since the start of the war, Slovakia has held four elections: regional and municipal elections (2022), parliamentary elections (2023), and presidential and EU elections (both 2024). While Ukraine was a significant topic in most of them, government politicians focused more on fears of war spilling into Slovakia or halting military aid.
During the 2023 parliamentary elections, Fico campaigned on the promise that under his leadership, “Slovakia will not send a single bullet to Ukraine.” He also pledged to push for an immediate peace deal and reconsider sanctions against any country based on their economic impact on Slovakia.
In the 2024 presidential election, Peter Pellegrini falsely accused his main rival, former Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok (PS/RE), of being a “war president” who would send Slovak men to fight in Ukraine.
Unlike Poland, where benefits for Ukrainian refugees became a major issue during the 2025 presidential campaign, or Czechia, where opposition leader Andrej Babiš spoken out against extending temporary protection, Slovak politicians largely avoided this topic.
According to Dubóczi, Slovakia has maintained a “communication dichotomy,” distinguishing between military aid, which the government opposes, and humanitarian aid, which it continues to support.
“However, since Fico’s visit to Moscow and the rise of Donald Trump, those boundaries have shifted. Slovak leaders increasingly believe they are on the right side of history,” Dubóczi notes.
Can the EU step in?
Dubóczi highlights that the EU offers tools like the Digital Services Act (DSA) to counter disinformation, including Russian propaganda, but national governments must take the initiative.
“Since 2023, when Fico’s government took office, we have seen no willingness to address this issue at the level of the ruling coalition. On the contrary—manipulation and propaganda were instrumental in bringing it to power, and they remain key to its persistence,” he concluded.
Moreover, from 2020 to 2023, Slovakia made minimal progress in strengthening its societal resilience against disinformation.
While other EU nations are trying to introduce measures to promote media literacy, fact-checking, and transparency, Slovakia has largely fallen behind – as evidenced by its poor PISA tests results.
Moreover, political polarisation and distrust in traditional media outlets exacerbated the situation, creating an environment where disinformation could thrive.
Given the circumstances, it seems unlikely that Slovakia’s struggle against disinformation will change anytime soon — and almost certainly not before the next parliamentary elections in 2027.
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